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Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Mont. 2010). 
 
Matt Pugh 
 
ABSTRACT 
The court in Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar considered whether the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service‟s 2009 Final Rule delisting the gray wolf in Montana and Idaho violated the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA).  At issue was whether the language of the ESA permitted the 
agency to list or delist a portion of a distinct population segment of gray wolves.  The court 
rejected the delisting decision, finding it was essentially a political solution that did not comply 
with the ESA. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the gray wolf‟s reintroduction to the northern Rocky Mountains, competing 
interests have debated the management and protection paradigms afforded to this species under 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
91
  The court in Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar characterized 
the controversy surrounding wolves as “steeped in stentorian agitprop.”92  Despite the varied 
sentiment on the topic, the court largely avoided the political and scientific arguments, and 
instead focused primarily on the issue of statutory interpretation.  The essence of the claim was 
whether or not the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (Service) may legally list only a portion of a 
distinct population segment (DPS) pursuant to the mandates of the ESA.
93
  The court held that 
the northern Rocky Mountain  gray wolf DPS must be listed or delisted as a complete unit, 
allowing consistent protection across the population.
94
  The decision in this case has broad 
implications for species management under the ESA. 
                                                          
91
 The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).  
92
 Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 (D. Mont. 2010). 
93
 Id. at 1211. 
94
 Id. at 1228. 
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II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
 Though wolves were once abundant throughout most of North America, hunting and a 
government-sponsored eradication program resulted in their extirpation across most of their 
historic range.
95
  By the 1930s, the wolf populations in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming were 
eliminated.
96
  Consequently, the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf was listed as an endangered 
species in 1974.
97
 
In 1987, the Service developed a wolf recovery plan with a goal of establishing at least 
ten breeding pairs and 100 wolves for three consecutive years in three core recovery areas: 
northwestern Montana, central Idaho, and the greater Yellowstone area.
98
  A 1994 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) found the plan to be “reasonably sound” and sufficient to 
“maintain a viable wolf population in the foreseeable future,” but predicted long-term persistence 
could require at least thirty breeding pairs and more than 300 wolves with genetic exchange 
between subpopulations.
99
 
After successful reintroduction efforts, the northern Rocky Mountain wolf population 
achieved the numeric recovery goal of thirty breeding pairs and 300 individuals starting in 2000 
and continuing every year thereafter.
100
  In light of the species‟ rapid recovery and growing 
population, the Service began the delisting process in 2007 by identifying the northern Rocky 
Mountain DPS.
101
  This DPS included all of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, as well as portions 
of eastern Washington, eastern Oregon, and northern Utah.
102
  
                                                          
95
 Id. at 1212.  
96
 Id.  
97
 Id.  
98
 Id.  
99
 Id. 
100
 Id. at 1212-1213.  
101
 Id. at 1213.  
102
 Id.  
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The 2008 DPS designation and delisting was challenged by twelve environmental 
advocacy groups, all of whom are parties in the present action.
103
  The court granted a 
preliminary injunction in July 2008 to enjoin implementation of the 2008 Rule, and later vacated 
and remanded it to the Service for further consideration.
104
  The court found that the Service 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in delisting the DPS without evidence of sufficient genetic 
exchange and in relying on Wyoming‟s 2007 wolf management plan, which failed to manage for 
fifteen breeding pairs and included a “malleable trophy game area.”105   
On remand, the Service reopened the comment period and issued a new Final Rule in 
April 2009.
106
  The Final Rule included new data demonstrating genetic exchange between 
subpopulations and continued numerical sufficiency.
107
  The Final Rule further noted that 
Montana and Idaho had the requisite laws, plans, and regulations to ensure a healthy population, 
while Wyoming‟s regulatory framework failed to meet ESA requirements.108  Considering this, 
the Final Rule removed ESA protections throughout the northern Rocky Mountain DPS, except 
in Wyoming.
109
  Subsequently, Montana and Idaho authorized public wolf hunts beginning in 
September 2009.
110
 
III.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 In response to the 2009 Final Rule delisting the wolf in all of the DPS except Wyoming, 
Defenders of Wildlife sought judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
111
 and the 
                                                          
103
 Id.  
104
 Id. (discussing Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (D. Mont. 2008)). 
105
 Id. (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Hall, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (D. Mont. 2008)). 
106
 Id. 
107
 Id.  
108
 Id. 
109
 Id. 
110
 Id. at 1213-1214.  
111
 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.  
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ESA.
112
  The Greater Yellowstone Coalition filed a similar challenge, and the two cases were 
consolidated on June 12, 2009.
113
  The plaintiffs were joined by other environmental advocacy 
groups.  Other parties, including the State of Montana and the State of Idaho, intervened in 
support of the Final Rule.
114
   
 Defenders of Wildlife listed nine separate reasons why the delisting  violated the ESA:  
(1) it violated the statute by partially protecting  a listed species; (2) it was based on outdated and 
unscientific recovery targets; (3) there was a lack of genetic connectivity to support the decision; 
(4) the regulatory mechanisms inadequately protected wolves without the protection of the ESA; 
(5) the Service failed to consider loss of historic range when determining whether the wolves 
were recovered; (6) the Service disregarded the status of gray wolves throughout the lower-forty-
eight states; (7) the decision violated the ESA by delisting a previously unlisted population of 
wolves; (8) the DPS boundaries were defined contrary to the ESA and the Service‟s own policy; 
and (9) the decision impermissibly designated wolves in Wyoming as a “non-essential, 
experimental” population.115   
Plaintiff Greater Yellowstone Coalition challenged the decision for violating the ESA on 
five counts:  (1) the Service arbitrarily assessed current and future genetic connectivity; (2) the 
regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to assure genetic connectivity; (3) the decision violated 
the ESA by partially protecting a listed population; (4) the Service failed to consider loss of 
historic range; and (5) the decision impermissibly designated wolves in Wyoming as a “non-
essential, experimental” population.116 
                                                          
112
 Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 1211. 
113
 Id. at 1213. 
114
 Id.  
115
 Id. at 1211. 
116
 Id.  
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In August 2009, the plaintiffs‟ motions for a preliminary injunction to suspend the Montana 
and Idaho wolf hunts were denied because they failed to show irreparable harm given the limited 
number of wolves authorized for taking by hunting.
117
   
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
 The principal argument in this case was the plaintiffs‟ claim that the plain terms of the 
ESA did not permit the Service to list only a portion of a DPS as endangered.
118
  The plaintiffs 
argued that an agency-created sub-DPS taxonomy violated the ESA and was beyond Congress‟ 
authorization.
119
  In reaching its decision, the court examined the plain meaning of the language, 
as well as the statutory construction and legislative history of the ESA.
120
 
 The court first examined the three step listing/delisting process.
121
  First, the Service must 
identify the species taxonomically, and also recognize any subspecies or DPSs.
122
  Next, the 
Service must decide whether to list a species as either threatened or endangered, or to delist the 
species.
123
  The final step in the process is listing a species in the Federal Register and specifying 
the portion of its range where it is endangered or threatened.
124
  After taking these steps, critical 
habitat must also be identified within the species‟ range.125 
 Through this process, the Service determined the northern Rocky Mountain gray wolf 
DPS was in danger of extinction throughout a significant portion of its range (Wyoming), but 
then only applied the ESA protections to that one geographic area of the DPS.
126
  The plaintiffs 
argued that the whole northern Rocky Mountain DPS must be listed or delisted at the same 
                                                          
117
 Id. at 1213-1214.  
118
 Id. at 1215.  
119
 Id. 
120
 Id. at 1215-1227. 
121
 Id. at 1215. 
122
 Id.  
123
 Id. at 1216.  
124
 Id.  
125
 Id.  
126
 Id.  
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management level.
127
  The plaintiff‟s argument was supported by the Service‟s historical view 
that the ESA prohibited a legal taxonomy smaller than a DPS.
128
  In order to rule on this, the 
court examined the 2009 Final Rule to determine whether its statutory interpretation of certain 
language was a permissible construction of the ESA.
129
 
 The plaintiffs also argued that an “endangered species” meant any species, subspecies, or 
DPS “in danger throughout a significant portion of its range.”130  Conversely, the defendants 
contended the phrase “endangered species” meant any species in danger of extinction throughout 
all or a significant portion of its range.
131
  In addition, the defendants claimed that the language 
“significant portion of its range” suggested the ESA is ambiguous regarding what must be 
protected as endangered.
132
  The court rejected the defendants‟ interpretation of the statutory 
language, finding the phrase “significant portion of its range” dictated when a species is 
endangered as opposed to where a species is endangered.
133
  Furthermore, it held that 
interpreting “endangered species” to mean any wolf in the DPS that is in danger throughout a 
significant portion of the DPS went against the plain language of the ESA.
134
  Pursuant to the 
statute, the court ruled the term “species” referred to the entity to be listed or delisted and the 
range that species, subspecies, or DPS occupied.
135
 
 The defendants next argued that the plaintiffs‟ reading of the statute rendered the word 
“or” in the phrase “in danger throughout all or a significant portion of its range” superfluous.136  
Such an interpretation would have allowed the Service to stop its analysis once it found danger 
                                                          
127
 Id.  
128
 Id.  
129
 Id. at 1216-1217.  
130
 Id. at 1217.  
131
 Id. at 1217-1218.  
132
 Id. at 1218.  
133
 Id.  
134
 Id. at 1218-1219.  
135
 Id. at 1219.  
136
 Id.  
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across a significant portion of a species‟ range; thus, never having to determine if a species was 
in danger throughout all of its range.
137
  Legislative history showed the language “or a significant 
portion of its range” was added in 1973 to allow for protection of a species even when not 
threatened with worldwide extinction.
138
  In light of this history, the court found the plaintiffs‟ 
interpretation of the statute avoided rendering it superfluous or redundant.
139
 The court also 
noted that different portions of a DPS could be weighted differently when determining whether 
to list an entire DPS, and that when a DPS is listed as threatened, protections can vary within that 
DPS.
140
  However, none of the cases cited by the defendants supported the proposition that the 
ESA allowed for partial listings or protections of a statutorily defined DPS.
141
   
 The defendants next argued that the publishing requirements of Section 4(c)(1) of the 
ESA, requiring the Secretary to “specify with respect to each species over what portion of its 
range it is endangered or threatened,” was ambiguous and allowed the Service to remove species 
protections from part of a DPS.
 142
  The court rejected the defendants‟ interpretation of the statute 
because it ignored the fact that the publishing requirement comes only after the Service 
determines the status of a species, and allowing a publishing requirement to alter a substantive 
determination under the ESA would be senseless.
143
   
The publishing requirement provision required the Secretary to list the species‟ common 
and scientific names and include over what portion of the species‟ range it was endangered or 
threatened.
144
  Without the listing of the species range there would be no way to identify if a 
                                                          
137
 Id.  
138
 Id. (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
139
 Id.  
140
 Id. (discussing Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 559 F.3d 946, 946-961 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
141
 Id.  
142
 Id. at 1220.  
143
 Id.  
144
 Id.  
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species was listed below its taxonomic level.
145
  In the 2009 Final Rule, the Service included 
“Northern Rocky Mountain DPS” with the common name and listed Wyoming as the range in 
which the wolf was endangered.
146
  The court found that including the DPS with the common 
name impermissibly allowed the Service to remove protections over a range smaller than the 
DPS.
147
  The definition of “species” applies to all sections of the ESA and excludes distinctions 
below a DPS.
148
 
Having determined that the ESA unambiguously prohibited the Service from listing or 
protecting part of a DPS, the court turned to whether the Service‟s decision deserved 
deference.
149
  Deference can only exist when an agency changes policy in a reasoned fashion that 
is adequately justified.
150
  The Service stated in previous Final Rules that delisting can occur 
only when a species (or subspecies or DPS) is recovered.
151
  Additionally, the Service stated that 
DPS boundaries could not be subdivided and wolves could not be delisted on a state-by-state 
basis.
152
  Since the approach taken in the 2009 Final Rule was clearly inconsistent with the 
Service‟s previous pronouncements, the “convenient switch” to its current interpretation was 
given little deference by the court.
153
 
After refusing to give deference to the Service‟s abrupt change in policy, the court 
analyzed whether its interpretation was permissible under the ESA.
154
  An interpretation will be 
upheld as reasonable if it “reflects a plausible construction of the statute‟s plain language and 
                                                          
145
 Id. at 1220-1221.  
146
 Id. at 1221.  
147
 Id.  
148
 Id.  
149
 Id. at 1222.  The court will defer to agency interpretation when a statute is ambiguous under the Chevron 
doctrine. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
150
 Id.  
151
 Id. 
152
 Id.  
153
 Id.  
154
 Id. at 1224.  
 Page | 25  
 
does not otherwise conflict with Congress‟ expressed intent.”155  Plaintiffs challenged the 
reasonableness of the Service‟s interpretation of the ESA because it rendered the concept of the 
DPS superfluous, allowed for protection of plants and invertebrates in a manner explicitly 
against Congress‟ intent, and thwarted the overall purpose of the law.156  In 1978, Congress 
amended the definition of “species” by removing taxonomic categories below subspecies in an 
effort to preserve the Service‟s ability to protect populations of the same species differently, 
while preventing listing a population at the level of a “city park.”157  If the Service were allowed 
to selectively apply protections to just part of a species, the DPS concept would be redundant.
158
   
The Service‟s interpretation of the ESA produced a strained result when applied to carry 
out the purposes of the ESA.
159
  The court therefore held the Service could not apply protection 
to wolves only in Wyoming and ensure that no portion of the DPS go extinct, despite adequate 
regulations in Montana and Idaho.
160
  
The ESA‟s legislative history provided additional guidance.161  In examining the 
definition of “species” under the ESA, it was clear that nothing in the history of the statute 
supported the contention that the Service was allowed to list a DPS, subdivide it, and then afford 
only part of the DPS the mandated protections.
162
  Listing a DPS in three states, but only 
protecting it in one, is not supported by the ESA.
163
  Therefore, the 2009 Final Rule did not 
comply with the law to the extent that it partially listed or only protected a portion of the DPS.
164
 
                                                          
155
 Id.  
156
 Id. 
157
 Id.  
158
 Id.  
159
 Id. at 1225.  
160
 Id.  
161
 Id. at 1226.  
162
 Id. at 1227-1228.  
163
 Id.  
164
 Id. at 1228.  
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Plaintiffs contended the 2009 Final Rule must be vacated and set aside, while the 
defendants sought a remand without vacating the Final Rule.
165
  Montana argued that vacating 
the Final Rule was unnecessary, since the only difference between state and federal management 
was wolf hunts, and the 2009 hunt only reduced the population of wolves in Montana from 497 
to 493; remand was therefore the appropriate remedy.
166
  While the court noted the practical 
appeal of this argument, the court ultimately vacated the Final Rule because it unlawfully failed 
to list and protect the entire DPS.
167
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The court held that the northern Rocky Mountain DPS of the gray wolf must be listed or 
delisted as a complete unit, allowing consistent protection across the population.
168
  Though it 
recognized the Service‟s solution as pragmatic and even practical, the court rejected the 2009 
Final Rule delisting the wolf throughout Montana and Idaho, finding it was in essence a political 
solution that did not comply with the ESA.
169
 
  
                                                          
165
 Id.  
166
 Id.  
167
 Id.  
168
 Id.  
169
 Id.  
